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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the relation between growth in total
factor productivity (TFP) and aggregate employment. Authors who looked
at this relation in the theoretical literature concluded that the impact of
TFP growth on employment is ambiguous.1 We bring together results in a
simplified equilibrium model, with employment, wages and the capital stock
as unknowns, which shows that the net impact of TFP growth on employ-
ment is negative when new technology is embodied in new jobs but positive
when it is disembodied.2 We then estimate the impact of TFP growth on
employment, wages and the capital stock with annual panel data for the
United States, Japan and twelve of the countries of the European Union.
The estimates show that TFP growth has a strong positive impact on all
three unknowns. It can explain virtually all changes in trend unemployment
in the United States in 1965-1995. It can also explain a large fraction of the
changes in European unemployment.3
The final task of the paper is to use the estimates to evaluate the models
used to study the relation between TFP growth and employment, and make
inferences about the degree to which new technology is embodied in new
jobs.
Our empirical results are inconsistent with the Schumpeterian assumption
of embodied technology and creative destruction. We find support for the
Solow assumption of disembodied technology. We also find evidence that
the channels identified in perfect-foresight search-equilibrium models with a
Nash solution for wages are not strong enough to explain the full estimated
impact of TFP growth on employment. We show that a more naive wage
equation than the one that we use can increase the impact of TFP growth on
employment in the quantitative model, mirroring results obtained by Shimer
(2003) and Hall (2003) for cyclical unemployment.
1See, for example, Aghion and Howitt (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), who
model long-term eﬀects of growth on employment. Other authors, e.g. Phelps (1994) and
Ball and Moﬃt (2002) argue that the eﬀects of growth on employment are unambiguous
but temporary.
2It should be emphasized that when we say embodied technology, we mean embodied
in new jobs, not only in new capital. Technology may be embodied in new capital, like
a later version of Microsoft Windows that may need a more powerful computer, but not
embodied in new jobs, because the worker who worked with the previous version of MS
Windows keeps her job and learns how to use the new version. In this paper we have
nothing to say about technology that is embodied or disembodied in new captal.
3See Staiger et al. (2002) for the trend dynamics of US unemployment. We show that
our predicted unemployment series when only TFP is allowed to vary tracks well their
constructed univariate unemployment trend (the “NAIRU”).
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Our model is new but draws heavily on models with frictions and quasi-
rents by Pissarides (2000, chapter 3), Aghion and Howitt (1994), Mortensen
and Pissarides (1998) and others. Its focus is the demand side of the labor
market, the job creation and job destruction decisions of firms.4 Its steady
state is characterized by balanced growth with unknowns the rate of employ-
ment, the rate of unemployment, the capital stock and the wage rate, and
exogenous variables TFP growth, the cost of capital and the labor force (and
some other institutional variables). Our key assumption is that if there is ag-
gregate TFP growth at some rate a > 0, productivity in existing jobs grows
on average at a lower rate λa, with λ ∈ [0, 1], because some new technology
is embodied in new jobs and existing jobs cannot benefit from it. Faster TFP
growth decreases overall employment for low λ but increases it for high λ.
One objective of our empirical work is to obtain a plausible value for λ.
In our empirical model we find that although on impact faster TFP growth
temporarily decreases employment, most likely because job destruction re-
acts faster to shocks than job creation does, after the first year the response
turns positive and continues increasing for a few more years. This requires a
high value for λ. We show that our estimates imply that λ is close to unity
(in the range 0.96 to 1), implying that on average the fraction of new tech-
nology that cannot be adopted by existing jobs is too small to matter in
aggregate steady-state dynamics. Of course, this does not preclude substan-
tial incidence of “creative destruction” in individual sectors undergoing fast
technological change, or individual firms restructuring after the discovery of
new technology. Our aggregate findings, however, are consistent with other
recent empirical work, which also finds strong positive correlations between
aggregate productivity growth and employment.5
The introduction of frictions and quasi-rents into models of growth com-
plicates the analytics and the models are usually solved only for their steady
states. There has been virtually no work on the out-of-steady-state proper-
ties of growth models with frictions.6 This poses a problem for econometric
work, since the data that we use to estimate the model are generated in real
economies, whose adjustment to the steady state in response to TFP shocks
may take several years.
4See the notes to the literature in Pissarides (2000, chapter 3) for a brief discussion
of more references. There is a related literature that derives the eﬀects of productivity
growth from the supply side, see e.g., Phelps (1994) and Ball and Moﬃtt (2002) and the
discussion in section 7 below.
5See for example Phelps (1994), Fitoussi et al. (2000), Ball and Moﬃtt (2002) and the
introductory remarks by Krueger and Solow (2002, p. xxiii).
6A notable exception is the recent paper by Postel-Vinay (2002), which calibrates the
out-of-steady-state behavior of the Schumpeterian model discussed below.
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Our approach is to write and solve the steady-state version of the model
and derive some empirical restrictions on the steady-state behavior of our
endogenous variables. We then impose and test these restrictions on the
steady-state solution of the estimated empirical model. But in the estimation
we allow for data-driven unrestricted lags in the adjustment to the steady
state. We simulate the estimated adjustment paths and show that although
steady states are stable and satisfy our restrictions, the simulated adjustment
paths can be very long.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes and solves the
theoretical model. Section 3 takes the model’s structural equations and ex-
plains the derivation of the three estimated equations. Section 4 describes
our data and the growth accounting that we used to calculate TFP growth
for each country in our sample, and briefly discusses some econometric is-
sues. Section 5 presents the results of the econometric analysis and uses the
results to simulate the eﬀects of the observed productivity changes. Section
6 calculates the fraction of TFP growth embodied in new jobs and evaluates
the theoretical model.
2 The Model
We model employment by deriving steady-state rules for job creation and job
destruction for the representative firm. The key to the derivation of growth
eﬀects is to assume that job creation requires some investment on the part of
the firm, which may be a set-up cost or a hiring cost. Both firm and worker
will want such jobs to last and so they care about the way that the marginal
product and wage rate evolve over time.
In the steady state growth influences job creation through capitalization
eﬀects and job destruction through obsolescence. The precise influence on
each, however, depends on whether new technology can be introduced into
ongoing jobs, or whether it needs to be embodied in new job creation. In
order to write a model that can be matched to the data we assume that there
are two types of technology. One, denoted by A1, can be applied in existing
jobs as well as new ones, as in the Solow model of disembodied technological
progress. The other, denoted by A2, can only be used by new jobs, an idea
attributed to Schumpeter (see Aghion and Howitt, 1994). We let the rate of
growth of A1 be λa and the rate of growth of A2 be (1−λ)a, with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
so the total rate of growth of technology is a. Both λ and a are parameters.
The parameter λ measures the extent to which technology is disembodied. If
λ = 0 we have the extreme Schumpeterian model of embodied technology but
if λ = 1 all technology is disembodied. The parameter a is the growth rate of
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TFP in the steady state and is observable. The parameter λ is unobservable
by the econometrician but an approximate value for it may be inferred from
our empirical estimates.
Both technologies are labor augmenting and the production function is
Cobb-Douglas. The firm creates new jobs on the technological frontier,
adopting the most advanced technology of both types. But because existing
jobs cannot benefit from embodied technological progress, jobs move oﬀ the
frontier soon after creation. We denote output per worker by f(., .). The first
argument of f(., .) denotes the creation time of the job (its vintage) and the
second the valuation (current) time. At time τ , output per worker in new
jobs is
f (τ , τ) = A1(τ)1−αA2(τ)1−αk(τ , τ)α, (1)
where k(τ , τ) is the capital-labor ratio in new jobs at τ . But in jobs of vintage
τ output per worker at time t > τ is
f (τ , t) = A1(t)1−αA2(τ)1−αk(τ , t)α, (2)
where in general k(τ , t) 6= k(t, t). Note that in (2) the disembodied technology
A1 is updated but the embodied technology A2 is not.
When the firm creates a job it keeps it either until an exogenous process
destroys it, an event that takes place at rate s, or until it destroys the job
itself because of obsolesce, which takes place T periods after creation.7 There
is a perfect market for capital and the firm re-sells its capital stock when the
job is destroyed. Capital depreciates at rate δ and in order to focus on
employment we assume that there are no capital adjustment costs. When
the job is destroyed the employee is dismissed at zero cost.
The value of the typical job consists of two parts, the value of its capital
stock and a value V (., .) ≥ 0, which is due to the frictions and the quasi-
rents that characterize employment. The value of a job created at time 0
and lasting until T satisfies the Bellman equation, for t ∈ [0, T ],
r(V (0, t) + k(0, t)) = f(0, t)− δk(0, t)− w(0, t)− sV (0, t) + V˙ (0, t) (3)
V (0, T ) = 0.
All variables have been defined except for r, the exogenous rental rate of
capital, and w(0, t), the wage rate at t in a job of vintage 0. The interpretation
of this equation is the one that has become familiar from search theory. The
7A second endogenous job destruction process could be introduced along the lines of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), with the firm’s productivity being subject to idiosyn-
cratic shocks. This generalization would increase both the complexity and richness of the
model, but it is an unnecessary complication for the estimation purposes in hand.
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firm hires capital stock k(0, t) and makes net (super-normal) profit V (0, t),
which it loses when the job is destroyed. The capital stock k(0, T ) is re-sold.
The firm’s controls at time 0 are (a) whether or not to create a job worth
V (0, 0); and if it creates it, (b) when to terminate it, and (c) the path of
k(0, t) for t ∈ [0, T ]. The wage rate is also a control variable but we assume
that it is jointly determined by the firm and the worker after a bargain. We
take each of these decisions in turn, starting with capital.
2.1 Capital accumulation
Maximization of (3) with respect to k(0, t) yields the condition
k(0, t) = A1(t)A2(0)(α/(r + δ))1/(1−α) t ∈ [0, T ]. (4)
When t = 0, this expression refers to new jobs. The path of the capital-labor
ratio in pre-existing and new jobs follows immediately:
k(0, t) = eλatk(0, 0) (5)
k(t, t) = eatk(0, 0). (6)
New jobs are technologically more advanced than old jobs and also have more
capital than old jobs.
With (4)-(6) it is possible to derive some useful expressions for output
and labor’s marginal product. From (1) and (2) we find that the evolution of
output per worker in the typical job also satisfies expressions similar to (5)
and (6). From (2) and (4) labor’s marginal product is
φ(τ , t) ≡ f(τ , t)− (r + δ)k(τ , t). (7)
Clearly, given (5) and (6),
φ(0, t) = eλatφ(0, 0), (8)
φ(t, t) = eatφ(0, 0). (9)
It follows from these expressions that when technology on the frontier grows
at rate a, output, the capital stock and labor’s marginal product in existing
jobs grow at the lower rate λa. They jump up to the technological frontier
when the job is destroyed and a new one created in its place.
Because of (4), the solution to (9) is
φ(t, t) = A1(t)A2(t)(1− α)
µ
α
r + δ
¶ α
1−α
∀t. (10)
We introduce for future reference the notation
φ ≡ (1− α)
µ
α
r + δ
¶ α
1−α
. (11)
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2.2 Wages
The wage equation plays a key role in the transmission of the eﬀects of growth
to employment. We showed that the marginal product of labor in existing
jobs grows at the rate λa. We now show that because of competition from
new jobs, wages in existing jobs grow at faster rate, and so eventually jobs
become unprofitable.
When a job is created at time 0 the firm enjoys net payoﬀ V (0, 0), obtained
as the solution to (3). In order to determine wages we derive the worker’s
payoﬀs, as follows. In unemployment, in period t the worker enjoys payoﬀ
U(t), given by
rU(t) = b(t) +m(θ)(W (t, t)− U(t)) + U˙(t), (12)
where b(t) is unemployment income, θ ≥ 0 is a measure of market tightness,
m(θ) is the rate at which new job oﬀers arrive to unemployed workers and
W (t, t) is the present discounted value of wage earnings in a new job accepted
at time t. We assume m0(θ) > 0, m(0) = 0 and m(θ) → ∞ as θ → ∞. We
also assume no search on the job and that b(t) grows at the rate a, the average
rate of growth of productivity in the economy as a whole, an assumption that
could be supported by making unemployment income proportional to mean
wages. It is, however, easier and as general to write, at least for the moment,
b(t) = A1(t)A2(t)b, (13)
where b ∈ [0, φ) is a parameter. The restriction that b is strictly below φ is
required to ensure that market production is preferable to unemployment.
The present discounted value of earnings in a job of vintage τ satisfies
the Bellman equation, for t ∈ [τ , τ + T ],
rW (τ , t) = w(τ , t) + s(U(t)−W (τ , t)) + W˙ (τ , t) (14)
W (τ , τ + T ) = U(τ + T ).
Wages in each job share the quasi-rents that the job creates. The firm’s
rents are the solution to (3), V (τ , t), and the worker’s rents are the diﬀerence
W (τ , t)− U(t). We assume
W (τ , t)− U(t) = β
1− βV (τ , t), (15)
where β ∈ [0, 1) is the share of labor. This sharing rule is usually known in
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the literature as the Nash sharing rule. Standard manipulations yield8
w(τ , t) = (1− β)b(t) + βm(θ)V (t, t) + βφ(τ , t). (16)
We introduce the notation
ω(t) ≡ b(t) + β
1− βm(θ)V (t, t) (17)
and refer to ω as the reservation wage.9 The important feature of ω is that
it captures the external influences on wages, resulting from the attractions
of quitting to search for alternative employment.
Unemployment income b(t) grows at rate a by assumption and it follows
immediately from (3), (17) and (16) that both V (t, t) and w(t, t) also grow
at rate a. Therefore, we can write the wage equation as the weighted average
of the reservation wage and marginal product, with labor’s share acting as
weight. The reservation wage is the “outside” component and grows at rate
a, and marginal product is the “inside” component and grows at rate λa. For
a job created at time 0 the wage equation is
w(0, t) = (1− β)ω(0)eat + βφ(0, 0)eλat. (18)
Given (9) it now follows that wages in new jobs grow at rate a :10
w(t, t) = eatw(0, 0). (19)
Equations (18) and (19) contrast with (5)-(6) and (8)-(9). In new jobs
wages, the capital stock and technology grow at the same rate a. In existing
jobs technology and the capital stock grow at the same rate λa but wages
grow at a faster rate, which lies between a and λa.
2.3 Job creation and job destruction
The diﬀerential rates of growth of TFP, capital and wages in existing jobs
drive the results on employment. We integrate (3) to arrive at the present
8Make use of (15) to substitute W (t, t) − U(t) out of (12). Subtract the resulting
equation from (14) and use the result to substitute W (τ , t) − U(t) out of (15). Finally,
use (3) to substitute V (τ , t) out of (15) and collect terms, noting that (15) also holds in
the time derivatives because of the assumption of continuous renegotiation.
9A worker accepts a job that pays a wage w if and only if w/(r−a) ≥ U, where a is the
rate of growth of wages in the steady state. Therefore the reservation wage is (r − a)U.
From (12) and (15) rU = ω+ U˙ , which in a balanced growth equilibrium is rU = ω+ aU,
giving the reservation wage as ω = (r − a)U.
10See also below for more discussion of the mean wage equation.
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discounted value of profit from a job of vintage 0:
V (0, 0) =
Z T
0
e−(r+s)t (φ (0, t)− w (0, t)) dt. (20)
Making use of (8) and (18), we re-write (20) as
V (0, 0) = (1− β)
Z T
0
e−(r+s)t
¡
eλatφ(0, 0)− eatω(0)
¢
dt. (21)
We simplify the notation by noting that because of (10), (17) and (13),
V (0, 0), φ(0, 0) and ω(0) are all proportional to the level of aggregate tech-
nology, A1(0)A2(0). Therefore we can omit the time notation and write (21)
as
V = (1− β)
Z T
0
e−(r+s)t
¡
eλatφ− eatω
¢
dt, (22)
where φ was defined in (11) and
ω = b+
β
1− βm(θ)V. (23)
The firm chooses the obsolescence date T to maximize the job’s value.
Diﬀerentiation of (22) with respect to T gives:
T =
lnφ− lnω
(1− λ)a , (24)
at which date the reservation wage becomes equal to the worker’s marginal
product.
Figure 1 illustrates the firm’s optimal obsolescence policy. The horizontal
axis shows time and the vertical axis measures the log of the marginal product
of labor and wages. The broken line shows the path of marginal product if
the job were to stay on the technological frontier, which grows at rate a.
The continuous parallel line below it shows the reservation wage, which also
grows at rate a. A new job is created on the frontier at time 0 but the
marginal product of labor in it grows at the lower rate λa, shown by the
flatter continuous line. Eventually, the marginal product hits the reservation
wage line and the job is destroyed. The firm then (or another firm) creates
another job in its place, with marginal product on the frontier.11
11Note that the wage rate paid by the firm is a weighted sum of the reservation wage
and the marginal product. So, because marginal product takes a jump at T , wages also
take a (smaller) jump, but the reservation wage does not jump.
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It follows from figure 1 and (24) that if all technology is of the Solow
disembodied type, λ = 1,marginal product in figure 1 remains on the frontier
and the firm will never want to destroy a job through obsolescence. Job
destruction in this case takes place only because of the exogenous separation
process, and for aggregate employment L aggregate job destruction is sL,
independent of growth. But if λ < 1 faster growth (which makes all lines
in figure 1 steeper) leads to more job destruction, as by diﬀerentiation of
(24), ∂T/∂a < 0. But this eﬀect is partial because the reservation wage also
depends on the growth rate. If it is confirmed by the general equilibrium
analysis, aggregate job destruction in this case has two components, one
again given by sL and the other given by all the surviving jobs of age T,
which become obsolete.
To derive the equilibrium eﬀect of growth we integrate (22) to obtain:
V = (1− β)
µ
1− e−(r+s−λa)T
r + s− λa φ−
1− e−(r+s−a)T
r + s− a ω
¶
. (25)
For convenience, we introduce a new symbol for the coeﬃcients inside the
brackets:
y(λa) ≡ 1− e
−(r+s−λa)T
r + s− λa , λ ∈ [0, 1], (26)
so the returns from a new job, (25), simplify to:
V = (1− β)(y(λa)φ− y(a)ω). (27)
By diﬀerentiation,
y0(λa) > 0, y00(λa) < 0. (28)
In order to derive now the influence of the growth rate on job creation
and close the model, suppose that jobs are created at some cost, and that
the cost increases in the number of jobs created at any moment in time. A
number of alternative assumptions can be used to justify this assumption
and give the required result. We follow the search and matching literature,
which assumes that at the level of the firm the cost of creating one more job
is constant but marginal costs are increasing at the aggregate level because of
congestion eﬀects (see Pissarides, 2000). Let our measure of tightness, θ, be
the ratio of the aggregate measure of firms’ search intensities (e.g., the total
number of advertised vacant jobs), to the number of unemployed workers.
Then given the rate of arrival of jobs to workers, m(θ), the rate of arrival
of workers to jobs is m(θ)/θ. Consistency requires that this rate decrease in
θ, which is satisfied when the elasticity of m(θ) is a number between zero
and one. We denote this elasticity by η ∈ (0, 1) (which is not necessarily a
constant).
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We now assume that the cost of creating one more job in period t is a flow
cost A1(t)A2(t)c for the duration of the firm’s search for a suitable worker.
The proportionality of the cost to technology is an innocuous simplification
(but of course that the cost should be increasing at rate a is necessary for
the existence of a steady state). Letting V 0(t) denote the present value of
search for the firm (equivalently, the value of creating one more vacant job),
the following Bellman equation is satisfied:
rV 0(t) = −A1(t)A2(t)c+
m(θ)
θ
(V (t, t)− V 0(t)) + V˙ 0(t). (29)
Under free entry into search, V 0(t) = V˙ 0(t) = 0, and so each new job has
to yield positive profit, which is used to pay for the expected recruitment
costs. In period t = 0 the job creation condition is:
V (0, 0) = A1(0)A2(0)
cθ
m(θ)
, (30)
or equivalently,
V =
cθ
m(θ)
. (31)
We are now in a position to describe the determination of the optimal
destruction time T and the equilibrium market tightness θ. Conditions (17),
(13) and (31) are common to all firms and workers and can be used to yield
the following equilibrium relation between ω and θ:
ω = b+
β
1− β cθ. (32)
Substitution of V from (27) into (31) gives the following, which is another
equilibrium relation between ω and θ :
(1− β)(y(λa)φ− y(a)ω) = cθ
m(θ)
. (33)
Because (33) satisfies the envelope theorem with respect to T, in the
neighborhood of equilibrium (33) gives a downward-sloping relation between
ω and θ.12 But (32) gives a linear upward-sloping relationship, so (33) and
(32) are uniquely solved for the pair ω, θ for any value of T.Given this solution
for ω, (24) gives the optimal T . Job creation at time t in this economy is given
12Outside the neighborhood of steady-state equilibrium the relation between the job cre-
ation condition and θ may not be monotonic. See Postel-Vinay (2002) for a demonstration
in a related model.
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by x(t) = u˜(t)m(θ), where u˜(t) is the predetermined number of unemployed
workers and m(θ) is the matching rate for each worker.
In order to obtain the eﬀect of TFP growth on job creation, for given
unemployment, we diﬀerentiate (33) with respect to a to obtain:µ
cβy(a)
1− β +
c(1− η)
m(θ)
¶
∂θ
∂a
= (1− β) (λy0(λa)φ− y0(a)ω) (34)
where, as already defined, η ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of m(θ). The coeﬃcient
on ∂θ/∂a is positive but the right-hand side can be either positive or negative.
By (28), at λ = 0, when all technology is embodied, the sign is negative,
whereas at λ = 1, the sign is positive. But further diﬀerentiation of the
right-hand side with respect to λ shows that it is monotonically rising in λ.
Therefore, there is a unique λ, call it λ∗, such that at values of λ < λ∗ faster
growth reduces market tightness and at values of λ > λ∗ it increases it. At
λ = λ∗ growth has no eﬀect on θ.13
2.4 Aggregation
We now aggregate the representative firm’s equilibrium conditions to de-
rive the economy’s steady-state paths. Aggregate steady-state equilibrium is
defined by a path for the average capital-labor ratio (derived from the opti-
mality conditions (4), (5) and (6)), a path for the average wage rate (derived
from (18) and (19)) and a stationary ratio of employment to population (de-
rived from (33) and (24)). The exogenous variables are TFP, population and
the real cost of capital.
We discuss aggregation informally, with the help of figure 1. Because of
our Cobb-Douglas assumptions, the path shown for φ(., .) in figure 1 is a
displacement of the path of the capital stock (4) and of the one for output
per worker, (2), for each job. In the steady state a job is created in period
0, it is destroyed and another one created in its place in period T, which
is destroyed and another one created in period 2T and so on. Then, the
capital stock, output and labor’s marginal product from 0 to T, from T to
2T, and so on grow on average at rate a, the slope of the broken line in
figure 1, although growth for each individual job is not smooth. It is slow
at first and then jumpy at the time of replacement. But if new jobs in the
economy as a whole are created continually with the same frequency, which
13Note that if λ is small and faster growth reduces job creation, the general equilibrium
eﬀect on T may reverse because of the dependence of ω on θ. In a market with poor
outside opportunities existing jobs become more valuable and workers hold on to them
longer, by accepting lower wages. However, the empirical analysis finds no evidence for
such eﬀects.
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is an assumption that is required for a steady state, the aggregate capital
stock, output and marginal product will grow smoothly at rate a. Finally,
again with reference to figure 1, since the two components of the average
wage rate, φ(., .) and ω(.) both grow at rate a between 0 and T, the average
wage rate also grows at rate a.
Employment in the representative firm evolves on average according to
the diﬀerence between job creation and job destruction. At time t this is
L˙ (t) = x (t)− e−sTx (t− T )− sL (t) , (35)
where x(t) is job creation, and exp(−sT ) is the fraction of jobs of vintage
t− T that survive to T, and so become obsolete. In the steady state L˙(t) is
equal to the rate of change of the population of working age, which we assume
to be exogenous and equal to n. x(t) is given by u˜(t)m(θ) and so it grows
at n, because the number of unemployed workers u˜(t) grows at n, whereas
θ and T are the solutions to (24) and (33) and they are stationary. Steady-
state unemployment is the diﬀerence between the exogenous labor force and
steady-state employment. Steady-state employment is derived from (35) and
satisfies,
nL(t) = (LF (t)− L(t))m(θ)− e−(n+s)T (LF (t)− L(t))m(θ)− sL(t), (36)
where LF (t) is the exogenous labor force. Solving for L(t), we obtain:
L(t) =
¡
1− e−(n+s)T
¢
m(θ)
(1− e−(n+s)T )m(θ) + n+ sLF (t). (37)
When we discuss the empirical results we choose to work with the steady-
state rate of unemployment, which we denote by u. It is defined as the ratio
of unemployment to the labor force, u˜(t)/LF (t) :
u =
µ
1− L(t)
LF (t)
¶
=
n+ s
(1− e−(n+s)T )m(θ) + n+ s. (38)
Note that the solutions to T and θ are independent of the level of technology
but its rate of growth influences employment because it influences both T
and θ.
3 Empirical specification
Our aim is to estimate the productivity growth eﬀects implied by the equa-
tions for the capital stock, wages and employment. We estimate the struc-
tural equations and allow for unrestricted short-run adjustment lags by in-
cluding up to two lags of the dependent variables and TFP. The steady-state
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version of our model satisfies two restrictions that we impose on the estimated
model and test:
1. The rate of growth of wages and the capital-labor ratio in the steady
state are equal to the average rate of growth of TFP:
k˙
k
=
w˙
w
= a. (39)
2. Changes in the capital stock and TFP do not aﬀect steady-state em-
ployment
∂L
∂k
+
∂L
∂w
∂w
∂k
= 0, (40)
∂L
∂A
+
∂L
∂w
∂w
∂A
= 0. (41)
3.1 The employment equation
The structural employment equation is derived from (35). The structural
variables influencing job creation are derived from a log-linearized version
of (33), under the assumption that job creation costs are exogenous and
unobservable. These variables are the contemporaneous level of marginal
product, the wage rate, the interest rate and the expected rates of growth
of marginal product and the wage rate. Marginal product is proxied by its
arguments, the level of TFP and the level of the capital-labor ratio, and the
expected rates of growth of marginal product and the wage rate by the rate
of TFP growth.
The structural equation for job destruction is derived from (24). It de-
pends on the same variables as job creation, making it impossible to identify
them separately from a single employment equation. In the absence of long
time series for job creation and job destruction we have to compromise with
the estimation of a single employment equation and make what inferences
are possible about job creation and job destruction from it.
In the estimated employment equation the dependent variable is the ratio
of employment to population of working age and the independent variables
the level and rate of change of TFP, the level of the capital-labor ratio, the
real cost of labor and the real interest rate. The capital stock and the real
wage rate are treated as endogenous. In the short run we allow the capital
stock and TFP to have diﬀerent eﬀects on employment (e.g. because the
costs of adjustment in capital are diﬀerent from the technology implementa-
tion lags) but in the long run their eﬀects are restricted by (40)-(41). The
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diﬀerent adjustment lags in job creation and job destruction also imply diﬀer-
ential short-run and long-run eﬀects. Recall that TFP growth increases job
destruction, by reducing the useful life of a job, but may increase or decrease
job creation. Supposing that job destruction reacts faster than job creation
to shocks, as usually found in the data,14 we should expect the impact ef-
fect of productivity growth on employment to be negative, and either remain
negative or turn positive in the medium to long run, when job creation has
had time to adjust.
3.2 The wage equation
The structural wage equation is the aggregation of (16) with adjustment lags
to pick up any short-run dynamics. We estimate an error-correction equation
in wage growth and impose the restriction that real wages in the steady
state grow at the rate of TFP growth. We also include the first diﬀerence
in the inflation rate as an additional cyclical variable to pick up temporary
deviations from the steady-state path due to information imperfections or
long-term contracts. The unemployment income b(t) is represented by two
parameters of the unemployment insurance system, the ratio of compensation
to mean wages and the duration of entitlement. The parameter β stands for
the share of labor in the wage bargain and it is postulated that countries
with stronger unions extract a bigger share.
The other two variables in (16), the marginal product of labor and the
expected returns from search are represented by the level and rate of growth
of the capital-labor ratio and TFP, where now, in contrast to their eﬀects
on employment, both levels and rates of growth should have a positive im-
pact on wages. The capital stock is divided by the labor force (rather than
employment) to avoid spurious correlations due to cyclical noise in the em-
ployment series. In the steady state the unemployment rate is constant, so
steady-state results are not influenced by this change.
3.3 The investment equation
As with the wage equation, because of the cyclicality of employment, esti-
mating an investment equation by dividing the capital stock by employment
does not give reliable results and introduces identification problems vis-a-vis
the employment equation. We deal with this problem by replacing employ-
ment by the real wage and estimate an error-correction equation for the
14The standard reference is Davies, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). In some European
countries, however, job creation sometimes reacts faster than job destruction because of
firing restrictions. See Boeri (1996).
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capital stock. The long-run value of the capital stock to which the equation
converges is (6), with the capital stock proportional to TFP and the factor
of proportionality depending on the cost of capital and the cost of labor.
For the cost of capital we use the real interest rate but we also include a
variable for government debt, on the assumption that more government in-
volvement in capital markets makes it more diﬃcult for private business to
acquire funds.15
4 Data and estimation
4.1 Data: Measuring TFP
The data are annual for the period 1965-1997 for the countries of the Euro-
pean Union (except for Spain and Greece), the United States and Japan.16
Our data come mainly from the OECD database with some adjustments.
The definitions of variables and detailed sources are given in the Appendix.
The institutional variables (union density, benefit replacement ratio, benefit
duration and tax wedge) are from Nickell et al. (2001) and they are available
for the period 1960-1995. The Appendix describes how we calculated the
capital stock and the real interest rate for each country. The other variable
that we calculated is TFP growth, and we describe the procedure and results
here.
We measure TFP growth by making use of a conventional growth ac-
counting framework.17 The aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas
15The estimated growth eﬀects are unaﬀected by the inclusion of the government debt
variable in the investment equation and the change in the inflation rate in the wage
equation but statistically the overall fit of the equations improves because of the removal of
cyclical noise. We also experimented by including other cyclical measures as independent
variables, to make sure that the estimated coeﬃcients on TFP are not dominated by
cyclical eﬀects. The other measures included the cyclical component of GDP and the
deviation of hours of work from trend, for the countries with hours data. None of them
influenced the estimated coeﬃcient on TFP or its rate of growth, so we omitted them from
the preferred specification.
16The European Union countries in the sample are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. Greece was excluded because some of the institutional variables were
missing and Spain because the fast rise in unemployment in the 1980s and the introduction
of temporary contracts in 1984 make it an outlier for reasons unrelated to productivity
growth.
17We also obtained an alternative measure of TFP with virtually no change in the
results, by estimating a production function with country fixed eﬀects and time dummies
for each year in the sample.
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Table 1: Growth accounting for the European Union, United States and
Japan, 1965-1997
GDP growth Percentage contribution from
(%) capital labor TFP
United States 2.8 37.1 43.3 19.6
European Union 2.7 36.9 6.6 56.4
Japan 4.7 53.0 13.9 33.2
with the TFP variable picking up both types of TFP of the theoretical model:
Y = Kα(AL)1−α (42)
where Y,K and L are aggregate output, capital and employment and A =
A1A2. Converting (42) to logs, and denoting by d the change in a variable
between two years, we obtain
(1− α)d lnA = d lnY − αd lnK − (1− α)d lnL. (43)
As in conventional growth accounting exercises we replace Y,K,L by the
measured level of GDP, capital stock and employment. But in order to
obtain the rate of growth of TFP from the computed “Solow residual” we
follow Harrigan (1997) and smooth the labor share by expressing it as a
function of the capital-labor ratio and a country constant (results, however,
did not diﬀer significantly when the actual labor share was used instead):
(1− α)it = consti + β
µ
K
L
¶
it
+ εit (44)
with i denoting countries and t years in the sample.
Employment is measured by persons employed. In the countries that
have a long time series for hours of work computed TFP growth is faster
because of the fall in mean hours (especially in European countries) over the
sample period. Correcting TFP for changes in hours, however, would have
substantially restricted the sample because of the absence of hours data for
most countries.18 Table 1 reports summary results, which are as expected.
Figure 2 plots the computed TFP growth for the United States, the aver-
age for the countries of the European Union and Japan. The main stylized
18See Vallanti (2004, pp. 68-71) for results with the sub-sample of countries that report
hours of work. For these countries there is a correction for capital utilization and changes
in hours. The estimated eﬀects of growth on employment are, perhaps surprisingly, robust
to these changes.
17
fact of productivity growth is fast growth in the 1960s, especially in Japan
which was still undergoing reconstruction following the war, followed by a
slowdown everywhere in the second half of the 1970s and a recovery in the
1990s in the United States and Europe but not in Japan. There is clear evi-
dence of catching up with the United States in both Europe and Japan, with
the exception of the 1990s, when Japanese productivity growth fell behind.
Another notable feature of our computed series is that no strong cyclical
pattern is evident, giving us more confidence that our estimates pick up the
long-run eﬀects that are our focus.
4.2 Econometric issues
The structural model is estimated by three-stage least squares. In each equa-
tion we include fixed eﬀects for each country, and one time dummy for each
year in the sample. We also include country-specific dummies for German
unification.19 The inclusion of lagged dependent variables can lead to finite
sample biases with the within-group estimator. The results in Nickell (1981),
however, show that the magnitude of the bias diminishes in the length of the
time series in the panel. Since the sample runs for 31 years, the size of this
bias is likely to be small. The asymptotic unbiasedness of the coeﬃcients cru-
cially depends on the absence of serial correlation in the errors. This will be
investigated by using a serial correlation test described by Baltagi (1995).20
Finally, with lags of the dependent variable included, when coeﬃcients diﬀer
across countries, pooling across groups can give inconsistent estimates (Pe-
saran and Smith, 1995). We test for diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients across the
sample by using a poolability test described by Baltagi (1995).21
5 Estimation results
The results of the estimation are reported in Tables 2-4. The pooling restric-
tions on the slopes cannot be rejected at conventional levels (χ2L(126) = 25.89,
χ2w(180) = 176.69 and χ
2
k(126) = 41.36). The long-run restrictions (39)-(41)
are also imposed and not rejected at the 5% level, with χ2(4) = 9.60. The
19The dummies for German unification are obtained by interacting the fixed eﬀect for
Germany with the time dummies for the post-unification years, 1991-95.
20The test is an LM statitistic which tests for an AR(1) and/or an MA(1) structure in
the residuals in a fixed-eﬀects model. It is asymptotically distributed as N(0, 1) under the
null. See Baltagi (1995).
21The poolability test is a generalized Chow test extended to the case of N linear
regressions, which tests for the common slopes of the regressors. The test statistic is
asymptotically distributed as χ(q) under the null. See Baltagi (1995, 48-54).
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time dummies remove the common employment trends and cycles in the
countries of the sample and they are entered to avoid spurious correlations
due to those comovements.
The estimated coeﬃcients on the lagged dependent variables imply long
lags, which we illustrate with simulations in section 5.1. In the employment
equation the level of employment and the capital stock were deflated by
the population of working age. This normalization gave statistically better
results than the one that deflates the capital stock by the employment level,
but it is isomorphic to it. The terms of the employment equation can be
rearranged to yield
ln(L/P )t = 1.21 ln(L/P )t−1 − 0.27 ln(L/P )t−2 − 0.059 lnwt−1 − 0.076rt
+0.027 ln kt + 0.031 lnAt − 0.086d lnAt + 0.16d lnAt−1, (45)
where, as in the theoretical model, kt is the ratio of capital to employment.
The wage elasticity is −0.059 on impact but rises to −1.02 in the steady
state. The interest semi-elasticity is even higher, rising to −1.31 in the
steady state. There are significant influences from the rate of growth of TFP
on employment, which are negative in the first year but turn positive in the
second. These eﬀects are illustrated and discussed in the next two sections.
The wage equation is an error-correction equation with a long estimated
adjustment lag. The key variables of the model are statistically significant
and with the predicted sign. The capital stock and TFP aﬀect the wage rate
with positive coeﬃcient, in both levels and rates of change. Unemployment
has a restraining influence on wages, as predicted by the model, but its influ-
ence is reduced in countries that have long durations of benefit entitlement.
This is consistent with the view often expressed in policy analyses, that long
entitlement to benefit encourages the build up of long-duration unemploy-
ment, and reduces the economic role of unemployment in restraining wage
demands.22 This is the only parameter of the unemployment compensation
system that we found statistically significant. We did not find that taxes
increase wage costs but found that unionization does.
The capital stock in the wage equation is divided by the labor force in-
stead of the level of employment to avoid the introduction of cyclical noise
but of course since lnL− lnLF = ln(1− u) ≈ −u, the estimated equation is
approximately equivalent to an equation that has the ratio of capital to em-
ployment and three lags of the unemployment rate as independent variables.
The steady-state semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to the unem-
ployment rate, for a country whose unemployed lose half their entitlement
after one year’s unemployment, is estimated to be −0.04.
22See, for example, Layard et al. (1991).
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Table 2: The employment equation
Dependent variable ln(L/P )it
Independent Variables
ln(L/P )it−1 1.180
(27.12)
ln(L/P )it−2 -0.263
(-6.30)
lnwit−1 -0.057
(-4.46)
ln(K/P )∗it 0.027
(3.37)
lnAit 0.030
(3.34)
d lnAit -0.084
(-3.69)
d lnAit−1 0.160
(7.63)
rit -0.074
(-2.70)
Year dummies (31 years) yes
Fixed eﬀects (15 countries) yes
Serial Correlation 0.57
p-value 0.28
Heteroskedasticity 16.38
p-value 0.29
Obs. 462
Notes for Tables 2-4. The estimation method is three stage least squares. Numbers
in brackets below the coeﬃcients are t-statistics. (L/P )it is the ratio of employment to
population of working age in country i in year t, (K/P ) is the ratio of the capital stock
to the population of working age, A is measured TFP progress, w is the real wage rate,
and r the real interest rate. Serial Correlation is an LM test (Baltagi 1995) distributed
N(0,1) under the null (H0 : no autocorrelation). Heteroskedasticity is a groupwise LM test,
distributed χ2(N − 1) under the null (given υit = ci + λt + it, H0 : it is homoskedastic).
∗Instrumented variables: the instruments used are all the exogenous variables in the three
regressions and lags of the endogenous variables.
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Table 3: The wage equation
Dependent variable d lnwit
Independent Variables
d lnwit−1 0.058
(1.46)
d ln(K/LF )∗it 0.503
(4.24)
d lnAit 0.241
(5.89)
lnwit−1 -0.177
(-6.65)
ln(K/LF )it−1 0.083
(4.84)
lnAit−1 0.094
(5.45)
lnu∗it -0.010
(-2.31)
BDit ∗ lnu∗it 0.006
(2.88)
unionit 0.043
(2.10)
dtaxit -0.055
(-0.84)
rerit -0.020
(-1.30)
d2 ln pit -0.203
(-3.55)
Year dummies (31 years) yes
Fixed eﬀects (15 countries) yes
Serial Correlation 1.21
p-value 0.11
Heteroskedasticity 16.40
p-value 0.29
Obs. 462
Notes. See notes to Table 2. All variables have been defined except: LF is the labor
force, u the unemployment rate, BD the maximum duration of benefit entitlement, union
the fraction of workers belonging to a union (union density), rer the benefit replacement
ratio, tax the tax wedge and p the price level.
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Table 4: The investment equation
Dependent variable d lnKit
Independent Variables
d lnKit−1 0.963
(21.72)
d lnKit−2 -0.141
(-3.20)
rit -0.036
(-2.70)
lnw∗it -0.012
(-1.83)
lnAit 0.021
(5.12)
d lnAit 0.064
(5.88)
d lnAit−1 0.026
(2.37)
ln(K/P )it−1 -0.009
(-2.29)
d ln(D/K)it -0.005
(-2.08)
Year dummies (31 years) yes
Fixed eﬀects (15 countries) yes
Serial Correlation 0.38
p-value 0.35
Heteroskedasticity 18.46
p-value 0.19
Obs. 462
Notes. See notes to Table 2. All variables have been defined except for D, which is the
level of government debt.
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As with the wage equation, the capital equation is an error-correction
equation which is also characterized by a long adjustment lag. The interest
rate, wage rate and growth in government debt reduce private investment.
As claimed in the theoretical sections TFP and its growth rate drive capital
accumulation.
5.1 Simulations
We report the results of two simulations to illustrate the properties of the
estimated model, one showing the response of the endogenous variables to
a once-for-all fall in the rate of growth of TFP and the other calculating
the predicted unemployment series when TFP is given its observed values
and all other exogenous variables are held fixed at their initial values. In
addition to the three estimated equations we make use of the identity linking
employment with unemployment, Lt + u˜t ≡ LFt, where as before, LFt is the
exogenous labor force in period t and u˜t the number of unemployed people.
The estimated equations are re-written in the form:
lnLt = 1.212 lnLt−1 − 0.270 lnLt−2 − 0.059 lnwt−1 + 0.027 ln kt
−0.055 lnAt + 0.251 lnAt−1 − 0.164 lnAt−2 + C1 (46)
lnwt = 0.881 lnwt−1 − 0.058 lnwt−2 + 0.503 ln kt − 0.420 ln kt−1
+0.241 lnAt − 0.147 lnAt−1 − 0.010 lnut + 0.503 ln(1− ut)
−0.420 ln (1− ut−1) + 0.006(lnut ∗BDt) + C2 (47)
lnKt = 1.954 lnKt−1 − 1.105 lnKt−2 + 0.141 lnKt−3 − 0.012 lnwt
+0.085 lnAt − 0.038 lnAt−1 − 0.026 lnAt−2 + C3 (48)
The Ci are “constants,” by which we mean all variables not varied in the
simulations. The terms containing ln(1−ut) in the wage equation are present
because the ratio of the capital stock to the labor force in the estimated
equations was replaced by the ratio of the capital stock to employment.
Finally, consistency between equation (48) and the other two equations is
achieved by making use of the definition kt = Kt/Lt.
Figures 3 and 4 show the results of the first simulation. The objective
is to show the impact of changes in the rate of growth of TFP on the en-
dogenous variables but instead of assuming an arbitrary change in the rate
of growth, we simulate a productivity slowdown that corresponds roughly to
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Table 5: Actual and predicted unemployment rate, productivity slowdown
mean TFP mean rate of predicted rate of
Period growth (%) unemployment (%) unemployment (%)
US EU US EU US EU
1960-73 1.90 3.95 4.96 2.26 - -
1974-92 0.80 1.79 6.82 6.60 6.60 5.10
the slowdown observed after 1973. Table 5 shows the average TFP growth
rate prior to 1973 and the average growth rate up to 1992, before growth
picked up again. We initially fix TFP growth at its pre-1973 mean value (in
years 1-4 in figures 3 and 4) and then reduce it to the 1974-92 mean rate,
where we keep it until the end of the sample. We calibrate the constants Ci
(i = 1, 2, 3) such that all the endogenous variables are in a steady state in
the 4 years preceding the shock, in which the capital-labor ratio and wage
rate grow at the same rate as TFP and the unemployment rate is constant
at the rate shown in Table 5. Figure 3 shows the response of wages and
capital growth to the TFP shock and Figure 4 shows the response of the
unemployment rate.
First, we note that both wage and capital growth eventually fall to the
new level of TFP growth, but the fall is not instantaneous. Wage growth
falls faster than capital growth. Wage growth covers half the distance to
the new steady state in three years but the capital-labor ratio takes seven
years to cover half the distance. Second, unemployment responds with a
permanent rise (after a brief and small fall in the first year) but again the
response is slow. Half the rise is completed after five to six years. Although
there are some non-monotonic response patterns they are not strong enough
to cause anything like a cycle in any of the endogenous variables (given
the once-for-all exogenous change).23 Third, there is a marked diﬀerence in
the simulated unemployment series for the United States and Europe, due
largely to the diﬀerent TFP shock. TFP growth fell by more in Europe than
in the United States and this accounts for a predicted rise in unemployment
in Europe between 1973 and 1990 of 2.84 percentage points, in contrast to
the United States, where the predicted rise is only 1.64 percentage points.
Another reason for the diﬀerential response is the fact that the entitlement
to unemployment benefit is longer in Europe than in the United States. As
unemployment increases, the disincentive eﬀects of the unemployment insur-
23Adjustment in the aggregate capital stock is monotonic. But because employment
first rises and after one year falls, the change in the ratio of capital to employment also
reverses after one year.
24
Table 6: Actual and predicted unemployment rate
US EU
Period unemployment (%) unemployment (%)
actual predicted actual predicted
1970-73 4.96 - 2.26 -
1973-79 6.40 5.90 4.13 2.87
1980-89 7.17 6.87 7.53 4.75
1990-97 6.03 5.91 8.59 4.71
ance system when the duration of entitlement is longer increase, leading to
higher wages and so to higher unemployment in the countries with the longer
durations. The eﬀect of the productivity slowdown on unemployment is more
than half a percentage point larger in Europe when the impact of benefit du-
ration is taken into account. But, as Table 5 makes clear, despite the smaller
slowdown in the United States, our model gets closer to attributing the full
rise in US unemployment after 1973 to the slowdown, in contrast to Europe,
where our prediction falls short by about 1.5 percentage points.
The predictive power of the model is shown in the second simulation,
reported in Figure 5 panels (a) and (b). The figure shows the unemploy-
ment rate obtained from the model when we allow TFP growth to take its
actual values but keep constant at their initial values all the other exogenous
variables. Overall, the two figures indicate that our model explains a sig-
nificant portion of unemployment in the two economies, though with some
diﬀerences. TFP growth explains well the trend changes in unemployment
in the United States. Panel (a) shows three unemployment series, the actual
unemployment rate, the univariate trend unemployment rate constructed by
Staiger, Stock and Watson (2002) and our simulated series. The trend unem-
ployment rate peaks in 1980-81, in contrast to the actual rate which peaks in
1982 and our simulated rate which peaks in 1983, but despite this divergence
the correlation coeﬃcient between the trend unemployment rate and the sim-
ulated rate is 0.87. The rise up to the mid 1980s and subsequent decline are
picked up by the model. But in the European Union, TFP growth explains a
lower fraction of the overall change in the unemployment rate, and although
the model picks up some of the rise up to the mid 1980s, it fails to account
for the changes in the 1990s.
In Table 6 we report the average level of actual and predicted unemploy-
ment for three sub-periods. In 1970-73 we calibrate unemployment in the
model to the observed average. In the United States, the slowdown in TFP
growth after 1973 explains about 65 percent of the rise in unemployment in
the 1970s but the explanatory power picks up and by the end of the sample
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the model predicts a mean unemployment rate very close to the actual. In
Europe the slowdown of TFP growth explains about a third of the increase
in unemployment in the 1970s but it does not fully explain the further rise in
unemployment that occurred in the 1980s. It predicts a flat unemployment
in the 1990s, when unemployment went up by a full percentage point.
6 Quantitative evaluation of the model
The key result of the theoretical model is that TFP growth increases job de-
struction but it may increase or decrease job creation at given unemployment
rate, depending on the value taken by the parameter λ. Given our estimate
of a strong positive eﬀect of TFP growth on employment, we investigate two
issues in this section, (a) whether our estimates impose limits on the val-
ues taken by the parameter λ, and (b) whether a quantitative version of the
model is capable of explaining the estimated impact of TFP growth on em-
ployment. The parameter λ stands for the fraction of new technology that is
embodied in new jobs, so deriving a range for it will tell us something about
the nature of new technology.
The steady-state solutions for the three unknowns, T, θ and u, are given
by (24), (33) and (38). By diﬀerentiation with respect to a it is straightfor-
ward to show that a necessary condition for a positive impact of growth on
employment is that job creation should be higher when growth is higher; i.e.,
that ∂θ/∂a > 0. The smallest value of λ consistent with a positive ∂θ/∂a is
a lower bound on the values of λ consistent with our estimates.
From (34), ∂θ/∂a > 0 requires
λy0(λa)φ− y0(a)ω > 0. (49)
We obtain the range of λ that satisfies (49) when the other unknowns are
at their steady-state values. Since the left side of (49) increases in λ, a
lower bound on the values of λ that satisfy (49) is the λ∗ that satisfies it
with equality. The upper bound is 1. We compute λ∗ as the solution to the
following system of steady-state equations (all of which were derived in the
theoretical sections)
λ∗y0(λ∗a)φ− y0(a)ω = 0. (50)
y(λ∗a) =
1− e−(r+s−λ∗a)T
r + s− λ∗a (51)
y(a) =
1− e−(r+s−a)T
r + s− a (52)
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Table 7: Baseline Parameter Values
r 0.04 β 0.50
b 0.30φ η 0.50
c 0.10φ a 0.02
T =
lnφ− lnω
(1− λ∗)a (53)
ω = b+
β
1− β cθ (54)
(1− β)(y(λ∗a)φ− y(a)ω) = cθ
m(θ)
. (55)
The unknowns are λ∗, y(λ∗a), y(a), T, ω, and θ. The matching flow is assumed
to be constant-elasticity
m(θ) = m0θ
η. (56)
We give standard values to the parameters (shown in Table 7) except for
two which are not directly observable, s and m0, and which are obtained
by calibrating them to the job destruction rate and the steady-state unem-
ployment rate. The real rate of interest is 4 per cent per annum, the value
of unemployment income is fixed at the sample mean for the United States
and the hiring cost is taken from Hamermesh (1993), who estimates it on
average to be one month’s wages. The average recruitment cost in the model
is cθ/m(θ), which depends on the unknown θ, but it turns out that c is not
important in the calibration of λ∗ (or of anything other than θ, which is not
an interesting variable in this exercise). Wages in this economy are about 94
percent of the marginal product of labor (derived below), giving the values
0.3φ for b and 0.1φ for c. The value of φ need not be specified. The values
for β and η are the ones commonly used in quantitative analyses of search
equilibrium models and the value for TFP growth is its sample mean. We
calibrate to US values because they are the ones that are least contaminated
by policy on employment protection and other institutions that are not in
the model. However, calibrating to European values gives virtually identical
results.
According to Davis, Haltiwanger and Shuh (1996) the average job destruc-
tion rate in US manufacturing is 0.1 (and close to the average job destruction
rate in several other countries, see their Tables 2.1 and 2.2), which implies
that on average, when a firm creates a job it expects to keep it for ten years.
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In our model the mean duration of jobs is given by (1− exp(−sT )) /s, so we
treat s as an unknown and introduce the equation
1− e−sT
s
= 10. (57)
Finally, the parameter m0 is calibrated from the steady-state equation for
unemployment. In our sample the mean unemployment rate in the United
States is 6 per cent. We treat m0 as another unknown and introduce the
equation
n+ s
(1− e−(n+s)T )m0θ0.5 + n+ s
= 0.06. (58)
The value given to n turns out to be unimportant. In the model we identified
it with the net rate of growth of the labor force but more generally it is
the average annual rate of entry into the unemployment pool from outside
the labor force. We set it equal to 0.1, which implies that the flow into
unemployment from outside the labor force is approximately the same as the
flow from employment.
The solutions for all unknowns are given in Table 8. The critical value
for λ turns out to be 0.96. At this value ∂θ/∂a = 0, so the impact of TFP
growth on employment predicted by the model is still negative. But higher
values of λ might switch the sign to positive. Since the upper limit of λ is
1, the calculated value of 0.96 is a very high number. At realistic parameter
values obsolescence in this model turns out to be a very powerful influence
on both job creation and unemployment, and the capitalization eﬀect turns
out to be too weak an influence. In order to get a positive impact of TFP
on employment we need to eliminate obsolescence with a λ close to its upper
limit. At this high value of λ ≥ 0.96, by the time productivity growth makes
a job obsolete the job is certain to have ended for other reasons. As Table 8
shows, the solution for the maximum life of the job is so high, at 67.5 years,
that with the calibrated s no jobs reach that age to become technologically
obsolete.24
24The other solution values are reasonable and need not be dscussed, except for some
comments about θ, the ratio of recruitment eﬀort to search eﬀort. Although it is usually
interpreted as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment (in which case the number 6.52
would be unreasonable) we did not give it this interpretation. We used the steady-state
unemployment rate to infer it. It implies that on average the duration of unemployment
in the United States is between 3 and 4 months, which is reasonable. It also implies that
the average recruitment cost per employee is 0.206φ, or about 2 months’ wages. This is
higher than Hamermesh’s estimate, but changing the parameter c in the computations by
a factor of 2, which changes the recruitment cost, has no influence on the solutions for λ∗
or T and s. It aﬀects only the solution for θ.
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Table 8: Model Solutions
λ∗ 0.96 θ 6.52 y(λ∗a) 8.28
T 67.5 ω 0.94φ y(a) 8.34
s 0.10 m0 1.23
The computed value for λ∗ turns out to be robust virtually to all reason-
able parameter variations. Increasing b to 0.6 increases λ∗ to 0.976. Decreas-
ing it to 0.1 reduces λ∗ to 0.945. Increasing a to 0.05 increases λ∗ to 0.972
and increasing it further to 0.08 increases λ∗ to 0.988. These last two exper-
iments are obviously too unrealistic to be for the economy as a whole but
they may apply to individual sectors that are growing very fast. In the case
of a = 0.05 the maximum life of a job drops to 38 years and for a = 0.08 it
drops to 11.5 years. Finally, forcing the mean duration of jobs in the absence
of obsolescence to be 4.2 years (the mean duration of a job tenure rather
than the job) reduces λ∗ to 0.942.
The reason for this robust behavior is clear from equation (50). Because
the deviation between the reservation wage and marginal product in the
steady state of this economy is small, the solution for λ∗ is approximately
equal to the ratio of the slopes of the present discounted value terms y0(λa)
and y0(a). But the only diﬀerence between these two terms is in the discount
rates r+s−a and r+s−λa. The diﬀerence in these discount rates is what is
sometimes called the “capitalization” eﬀect of growth. With relatively large
values for r + s (0.14 in the benchmark case) and small a, the ratio of these
two expressions is approximately equal to 1.
We now turn to the quantitative evaluation of the model. Our computed
range of λ says that virtually all new economy-wide technology is disembod-
ied. In the steady state this leaves only the capitalization eﬀect of growth
and we investigate here whether the capitalization eﬀect is strong enough to
explain the full estimated impact.
The upper bound for λ is 1, when all technology is disembodied and the
capitalization eﬀect has its full impact. At λ = 1 the equations giving the
model solutions are
(1− β)(φ− ω)
r + s− a =
cθ
m(θ)
(59)
ω = b+
β
1− β cθ (60)
u =
n+ s
m(θ) + n+ s
. (61)
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The unknowns are θ, ω and u. We use the same parameters as before, Table
7, whereas now (57) gives s = 0.1. Rather than use an unemployment rate of
6 percent to compute m0, we use the initial unemployment rate for the US
economy in Table 5, 4.96. We then ask whether a fall in the TFP growth
rate from 1.9 to 0.8 percent is capable of producing a capitalization eﬀect
that is strong enough to raise unemployment in the steady state to the value
predicted by the estimates, 6.6 percent.
Our computations show that the impact of the fall in the TFP growth rate
is too small to explain the estimated rise in unemployment. At the baseline
parameter values unemployment rises to 4.98. Although diﬀerent parameter
values give slightly diﬀerent values, none of them gets close to explaining the
full estimated impact of the productivity slowdown. Two reasons appear to
be responsible for this failure. The first is similar to the one that gave the
very high values for λ∗. At plausible values for r and s, the observed TFP
growth rates are too small to make much diﬀerence to the discount factors
applied in the steady state, r + s − a. The important parameter is s, the
inverse of which is the expected duration of jobs. even at 10 years on average,
job durations are too short for the TFP growth rates to have much impact
on job creation through capitalization.
But a second important factor that works against the capitalization eﬀect
is the sensitivity of the wage equation to the tightness of the market. When
the TFP growth rate rises in this model the expected profit from job creation
rises, inducing firms to increase the tightness of the market (the θ in the
model). Wages rise for two reasons, partly because of the productivity rise,
and partly because of the rise in tightness. The Nash wage equation implies
that the second reason is suﬃciently strong to virtually oﬀset the rise in
profits associated with the rise in TFP. This discourages job creation reducing
the impact of TFP growth on employment.
Recently, Shimer (2003) and Hall (2003) made a similar criticism of the
Nash wage equation in the cyclical context: that it reduces substantially
the variance of unemployment in response to realistic cyclical productivity
shocks. The reason they give is the same as in this context, the excessive
response of wages to tightness. In the remaining of this section we evaluate
the impact of TFP growth on unemployment by switching oﬀ the link between
tightness and wages implied by the Nash solution, i.e., adopting the “naive”
wage equation, w = w¯φ, where w¯ is some constant between b and 1. This wage
equation still reflects productivity growth and the worker’s outside income,
but not the state of the labor market. It is a natural generalization of the
wage equation suggested by Hall (2003) for the cyclical economy.
The equilibrium expressions under w = w¯φ become very simple. If the
initial unemployment rate at some growth rate a¯ is denoted u¯, the unem-
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ployment rate at a new growth rate a is
u =
1
1 + 1−u¯u¯
r+s−a¯
r+s−a
. (62)
So, if at the initial equilibrium a¯ = 1.9 percent and u¯ = 4.96 percent, the new
a = 0.8 gives u = 5.68 percent. This is a substantial improvement over the
impact with the full wage equation, which increased unemployment merely
to 4.98. It explains about half the observed rise in unemployment. In order
to match exactly the estimated impact of TFP growth with our naive wage
equation we require r + s = 0.05, which is an implausibly low discount rate
in the context of this model. It implies that either the rate of return to
capital is extremely low, or that the expected life of a new job is extremely
long. But interestingly, even at r + s = 0.05, the baseline parameters with
a Nash wage equation still give only a slightly higher unemployment rate at
the lower growth rate of u = 5.16.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we showed that although equilibrium models of employment
imply that the eﬀects of faster TFP growth can be either positive or negative,
empirically the eﬀects are strongly positive, after an initial period of not
more than one year. We used our empirical estimates to obtain a prediction
of the extent to which exogenous TFP growth can account for the observed
changes in the rate of unemployment (or employment). The estimates do
a good job in attributing the rise and fall in trend unemployment in the
United States to the 1973 productivity slowdown and its subsequent recovery.
The estimates also attribute a substantial part of the rise in the European
unemployment rate to a productivity slowdown but empirically productivity
changes are generally less successful in explaining the dynamics of European
unemployment.
Our theoretical model is a perfect foresight model of job creation and job
destruction and so the impact of TFP growth on employment is derived from
the response of firms to changes in their implicit discount rates (the “capital-
ization” eﬀect) and to obsolescence (the “creative destruction” eﬀect). The
net eﬀect of TFP growth on employment in this framework depends critically
on the fraction of TFP growth that is embodied in new jobs. Our empir-
ical estimates imply that all new technology is disembodied and “creative
destruction” plays no part in the steady state employment dynamics of the
countries in our sample.25.
25It should be reiterated that our test was for technology embodied in new jobs, not
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But we also found that even with no creative destruction eﬀect, the cap-
italization eﬀect of faster growth is quantitatively too small to explain the
estimated impact of growth on employment. Assuming a more naive wage
equation than the Nash sharing rule, whereby wages reflect productivity but
not labor market tightness, increases substantially the calculated impact of
growth on unemployment, although about half the estimated impact is still
unexplained. Thus, the full size of the estimated impact of growth on unem-
ployment remains a puzzle. It could mean that there are additional forces
at work contributing to a positive relation between productivity growth and
employment, beyond the capitalization eﬀect. Such forces could be related to
the labor supply forces identified by Phelps (1994), Hoon and Phelps (1997)
and Ball and Moﬃtt (2002), which, although temporary, imply long lags in
the eﬀect of growth on employment.26 More work is needed in linking the
demand-side factors modeled here and the supply-side factors modeled by
others. There could also be other forces at work. The estimated impact of
TFP growth on employment at the aggregate level is certainly suﬃciently
large to warrant more work, both theoretical and empirical.
.
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8 Appendix: Data definitions and sources
L Total employment (source: OECD National Accounts).
P Working age population (source: OECD National Accounts).
LF Labor force (source: OECD National Accounts).
w Real labor cost: w =
µ
WSSE
defGDP
¶
/(L − Lself ), where WSSE is the
compensation of employees at current price and national currencies
(source: OECD Economic Outlook), defGDP is the GDP deflator, base
year 1990 (source: OECD National Accounts), L is total employment
and Lself is the total number of self- employed (source: OECDNational
Accounts).
K Real capital stock. The calculation of the capital stock is made accord-
ing to the Perpetual InventoryMethod: K = (1−δ)K−1+
µ
In
defINV
¶
−1
,
where In is the gross fixed capital formation at current prices and na-
tional currencies (source: OECD National Accounts) and defINV is
the gross fixed capital formation price index, base year 1990 (source:
OECD National Accounts) and the depreciation rate, δ, is assumed
constant and equal to 8 percent, which is consistent with OECD esti-
mates (Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). Initial capital stock is calculate
as: K0 =
I0
g + δ
, where g is the average annual growth of investment
expenditure and I0 is investment expenditure in the first year for which
data on investment expenditure are available.
A Total factor productivity (TFP). This is computed using the following
formula: d lnA =
1
1− α [d lnY − αd lnK − (1 − α)d lnL], where Y is
gross domestic output at constant price and national currencies (source:
OECD National Accounts), K is capital stock as defined above, L is
total employment as defined above, (1−α) is a smoothed share of labor
following the procedure described in Harrigan (1997). Labor share is
defined as (1−α) = wL
Y
. In order to make our measure of total factor
productivity comparable across countries, we convert both Y and K to
US dollars using the GDP and gross fixed capital formation Purchasing
Power Parities (1990) respectively (source: OECD National Accounts).
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r Real long term interest rate deflated by the 3-year expected inflation
rate: r = i−E(d ln p+1), where i is the long term nominal interest rate
(source: OECD Economic Outlook). E(d ln p+1) are fitted values from
the regression d ln p = γ1d ln p−1 + γ2d ln p−2 + γ3d ln p−3 + ν, where
d ln p is the inflation rate based on the consumer price index p (source:
OECD National Accounts) and the coeﬃcients on the right side are
restricted to sum to one, indicating inflation neutrality in the long run
(see Cristini, 1999).
u Unemployment rate: u = 1− L
LF
, where L is the total employment and
LF is the total labour force (see above for definition and data sources).
union Net union density defined as the percentage of employees who are union
members (source: Nickell et al. 2001).
tax Tax wedge calculated as the sum of the employment tax rate, the direct
tax rate and the indirect tax rate (source: Nickell et al. 2001).
rer Benefit replacement ratio defined as the ratio of unemployment benefits
to wages for a number of representative types (source: Nickell et al.
2001, constructed from OECD data sources).
BD Benefit duration defined as a weighted average of benefits received dur-
ing the second, third, fourth and fifth year of unemployment divided
by the benefits in the first year of unemployment (source: Nickell et al.
2001, constructed form OECD data sources).
p Consumer price index , base year 1990 (OECD, Main Economic Indi-
cators).
D Gross government debt (source: OECD Economic Outlook and for UK
IMF International Financial Statistics) divided by the GDP deflator.
For missing values before 1970, debt is calculated using the formula:
D − D−1 = DF , where DF is the government deficit (source: IMF
International Financial Statistics).
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Figure 1 
Expected returns and costs from job creation 
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Growth rates of TFP, wages and the capital-employment ratio following the 1973 slowdown 
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Figure 4 
 
Predicted unemployment response to the 1973 productivity slowdown 
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Figure 5 
 
Comparison between the actual and predicted unemployment rate when TFP takes its actual 
values and all other exogenous variables are held constant 
 
(a) United States 
 
(b) European Union 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
year
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
actual
trend
predicted
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97
year
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e
actual
predicted
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
 
662 Philip R. Lane 
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti 
Financial Globalization and Exchange Rates 
   
661 Alex Bryson 
Lorenzo Cappellari 
Claudio Lucifora 
Do Job Security Guarantees Work? 
   
660 David Marsden 
Richard Belfield 
Unions, Performance-Related Pay and Procedural 
Justice:  the Case of Classroom Teachers 
   
659 Rachel Griffith 
Rupert Harrison 
John Van Reenen 
How Special is the Special Relationship?  Using the 
Impact of R&D Spillovers on UK Firms As a Test of 
Technology Sourcing 
   
658 Douglas Kruse 
Richard B. Freeman 
Joseph Blasi 
Robert Buchele 
Adria Scharf 
Loren Rodgers 
Chris Mackin 
Motivating Employee Owners in ESOP Firms:  
Human Resource Policies and Company Performance 
   
657 Christopher Crowe Inflation, Inequality and Social Conflict 
   
656 James Banks 
Richard Disney 
Alan Duncan 
John Van Reenen 
The Internationalisation of Public Welfare Policy 
   
655 Eran Yashiv The Self Selection of Migrant Workers Revisited 
   
654 Hilary Steedman 
Sheila Stoney 
Disengagement 14-16: Context and Evidence 
   
653 Ralf Martin Globalisation, ICT and the Nitty Gritty of Plant Level 
Datasets 
   
652 Jörn-Steffen Pischke Labor Market Institutions, Wages and Investment 
   
651 Anthony J. Venables Evaluating Urban Transport Improvements:  Cost 
Benefit Analysis in the Presence of Agglomeration 
and Income Taxation 
   
650 John Van Reenen Is There a Market for Work Group Servers?  
Evaluating Market Level Demand Elasticities Using 
Micro and Macro Models 
   
649 Rachel Griffith 
Stephen Redding 
Helen Simpson 
Foreign Ownership and Productivity:  New Evidence 
from the Service Sector and the R&D Lab 
   
648 Fredrik Andersson 
Simon Burgess 
Julia I. Lane 
Cities, Matching and the Productivity Gains of 
Agglomeration 
   
647 Richard B. Freeman 
Douglas Kruse 
Joseph Blasi 
Monitoring Colleagues at Work:  Profit-Sharing, 
Employee Ownership, Broad-Based Stock Options 
and Workplace Performance in the United States 
   
646 Alberto Bayo-Moriones 
Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez 
Maia Güell 
Is Seniority-Based Pay Used as a Motivation Device?  
Evidence from Plant Level Data 
   
645 Stephen Machin 
Olivier Marie 
Crime and Benefit Sanctions 
   
644 Richard B. Freeman Are European Labor Markets As Awful As All That? 
   
643 Andrew B. Bernard 
Stephen Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms 
   
642 Patricia Rice 
Anthony J. Venables 
Spatial Determinants of Productivity:  Analysis for 
the Regions of Great Britain 
   
641 Kwok Tong Soo Zipf’s Law for Cities:  A Cross Country Investigation 
   
640 Alan Manning We Can Work it Out:  the Impact of Technological 
Change on the Demand for Low Skill Workers 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel  020 7955 7673     Fax  020 7955 7595     Email  info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site  http://cep.lse.ac.uk 
